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Abstract 
 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was 
launched in Lagos on 28 May, 1975, amidst fanfare and big dreams of 
economic nirvana: economic integration, development and prosperity. The 
template for the institutional mechanisms and infrastructure for the 
realization of the dreams were encapsulated in the Treaty itself and the 
relevant Protocols. The legal and institutional framework presented a picture 
perfect structure which only needed concerted and focused action, to realize 
ECOWAS’ lofty goals and objectives. 37 years after, this still remains a 
mirage. This paper examines the cause for this untoward status-quo and 
proffers ideas as to how the drive towards the actualization of the ECOWAS 
as a viable, virile, economic bloc can be attained. 
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Introduction 
 The main goal of the ECOWAS was the economic integration of the 
region as reflected in the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty thus: “It shall be the aim of 
the Community to promote co-operation and development in all fields of 
economic pactivity…for the purpose of … increasing and maintaining 
economic stability…and … contributing to the progress and development of 
the African continent.”13 In order to attain that goal, the Member States were 
required to, among other things, harmonise their economic and industrial 
policies and eliminate the disparities in the level of development of the 
Member States.14 To enable the ECOWAS to facilitate this objective, a 
Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission was set 
up. 15 
 The Treaty laid the foundation for a robust intra-regional trade 
regime by prescribing parameters for liberalisation of trade, such as a 
                                                          
13 Article 1. 
14 Article 1 (2) (f). 
15 Art. 4 (e). 
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Customs Union, Common Tariff treatment for community goods, et al.16 The 
Revised Treaty which came into effect in 1993 reemphasised pungently that 
“the aims of the Community are to promote cooperation and integration, 
leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa, in order to 
raise the living standards of its people and maintain and enhance economic 
stability”? The Community was to ensure the harmonisation of national 
policies in the areas of trade, money finance et al. The Community was also 
to promote joint ventures by private sector enterprises and other economic 
operators in particular through the adoption of cross-border investments. It 
was also to adopt measures for the integration of the private sectors, 
particularly the creation of an enabling environment to promote small and 
medium scale enterprises.  
 
Pre-1975 regional undercurrents 
 The issue of global and regional integration has always be in the front 
burner of international politics. As early as 1965, the Economic Commission 
for Africa (ECA), “in a tireless effort, organized four meetings throughout 
Africa, with a view to building viable economic groupings in each of the four 
sub-regions of Africa.”17 They were held in Lusaka (1965), in Brazzaville, 
Tangiers, and Niamey in 1966. The Niamey meeting was the first to be 
attended by all the West African States, who merely agreed that a “Project of 
Association” be embarked upon, “enlarging existing areas of eo-operation.”18 
A Conference followed in Accra Ghana19 which called for the removal of 
trade barriers between African countries “as rapidly as possible.”20  
 In 1964, Nigeria and Togo, which had a long history of political 
intercourse, signed an agreement in 1964 which “removed visa requirements 
placed on the movements of the citizens of the two States by their respective 
governments”.21 In 1966, the two countries entered into a trade agreement 
whose goal was the generation of maximum trade between the two countries, 
characterized by a covenant to promote and develop trade in compliance 
with the laws and regulations in force in each of the States. They also agreed 
that in order to enhance commercial intercourse; 
                                                          
16 Articles 12 -26. 
17 R. Onwuka, Development and Integration in West Africa; ECOWAS, Ife: University 
 of Ife Press, 1984, p. 60. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Attended by all except the Gambia and Guinea, April 27 – May 4, 1967. 
20 R. Onwuka, op. cit., p. 61. 
21 Nigeria’s Treaties in Force, V. 1; Lagos, Federal Ministry of Information, Printing 
Division, 1971, p. 25. On the same day, Nigeria also “exchanged notes” with Cameroun, 
Chad, Dahomey, Ivory-Coast, Niger and Morocco, abolishing visa requirements. Nigeria 
exchanged similar notes with Guinea less than one year later. 
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The contracting parties also agreed to furnish each 
other on request, all necessary information 
concerning the possibilities of supplying goods and 
commodities originating form their respective 
territories. They also contracted to grant freedom of 
transit of commercial goods originating in the 
territory of one of them and transported over the 
territory of the other.22  
A few years later, Nigeria concluded trade agreements with seven 
neigbouring countries in the West African sub-region and economic 
cooperation agreements with five.23 Between 1971 and 1973, Nigeria and 
Togo, who had emerged as clear leaders of the movement for integration 
developed a scheme of action which 15 States met to discuss in 1973.24 The 
States agreed to set up the required institutional structures for a Community 
and possible areas of cooperation, as well as the “taxonomies and nature of 
various levels of integration”.25 Later that year, a Draft ECOWAS Treaty 
was drawn up in Lome, Togo, with the assistance of the ECA, after which a 
second ministerial meeting was convened in Niamey, Niger, in March 1974 
to deliberate on it. Later that year, it was adopted in Liberia and submitted to 
the Heads of State Conference in Lagos on May 28 1975, where it was 
signed by eleven Heads of State and four Plenipotentiaries26 and became the 
ECOWAS Treaty. A revised version was to follow in 1993, which had 37 
more articles.27  
 
ISSUES STILL AT STAKE  
 The ECOWAS Treaty, Revised Treaty and specifically, the Protocols 
on Free Movement held so much promise for the future economic prosperity 
of the region that was to come via integration. Cross-border movement has 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 
23 Okoi Arikpo, in a lecture delivered at the Nigerian Institute of External Affairs, titled 
“Nigeria and the O.A.U.”, 31 July 1974, pp. 11 – 12.   
24 The fifteen States were: Benin, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, Burkina-Faso, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal Sierra – Leone, Togo and Guinea – 
Bissau, (which was attending for the first time). 
25 14 Onwuka, op. cit., p. 69. 
26 The eleven Heads of State who signed the Treaty were: Mathew Kerekou, (Dahomey); 
Dauda Jawara, (The Gambia); Liuiz Cabral, (Guinea – Bissau);  Felix Houghphet Boigny, 
(Ivory Coast); William Tolbert, (Liberia); Moktar Duld Daddah, (Mauritania); Seyni 
Kountche, (Niger); Yakubu Gowon, (Nigeria); Siaka Stevens, (Sierra – Leone); Gnassingbe 
Eyadema, (Togo); A. Anguole Lamizana, (Upper Volta). The four Plenipentiaries were from 
Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Senegal. 
27 Social affairs, Women Development, Settlement of Disputes, ECOWAS and other 
Regional  Economic Communities, Amendments and Revisions and Withdrawal. 
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been a time tested means of extenuating the effects of poverty and economic 
declension.  
 As stated by the Sahel Club, “migration and mobility within the 
region and beyond are populations’ prime strategy against poverty”.28 The 
club further opines that:  
Regional trade, be it informal or “official”, is the 
major grassroots integration driver. There are no 
significant statistics on the annual volume of 
regional trades on the types of goods traded, on 
exchanges between areas… Regional trade operators, 
whatever their size have denounced legal and illegal 
barriers that hinder free circulation (illegal “tolls”). 
They have appealed to the States to apply the law.29 
 One reason for this, which virtually all concerned stakeholders are 
agreed on, is the lack of political will on the part of Member States to 
implement the provisions of the Treaty/Protocols on Free Movement of 
Goods and Capital. In his keynote address at the international marketing 
ECOWAS’ 30th anniversary,30 Professor Jerry Gana.31 Expatiating on the 
lack of political will as the reason for past failure stated that “African 
governments were unwilling to subordinate their domestic political and 
economic interests to supranational institutions with long term regional 
goals”.32 Mike Obadan and Peter Egbon agree. In their words, 
The will to integrate is very much shaky…The lack 
of political will and commitment to implement 
community decisions has been a major stumbling 
block to integration efforts. At the level of the 
Authority of Heads of State, 
there is every indication of political commitment 
during ECOWAS summit meetings. But the political 
input at the national level tapers off soon after.33 
 They point out that the ambivalence exhibited by ECOWAS 
countries on the issue of political will weakens the ECOWAS’ standing in 
                                                          
28 Medium and Long-term Regional Development Perspectives in West Africa, (symposium 
held for the 30th Anniversary of the Economic Community of West African States, 
ECOWAS, Abuja (Nigeria), 25 and 26 May 2005), Edited by the Sahel Club, p. 58. 
29  Ibid. 
30 Held in May 2006, Abuja with the theme, ECOWAS: Milestones in Regional Integration: 
Daily Champion Newspaper, May 30, 2006, p. 40. 
31The former Nigerian Minister for Integration and Cooperation in Africa.   
32 Daily champion, op. cit. (See note 62). 
33 West African Regional Economic integration: Nigerian Policy Perspectives for the 1990s, 
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, (NIIA), Publication 1994, p. 55. 
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the international arena.34 They posit that while the political will and 
commitment to sub-regional groupings and international organisations that 
compete with ECOWAS are high, the same is lacking in the broader 
ECOWAS grouping.35It is this lack of political will that is the reason why 
Member States are often so loud about cataloguing the illegalities and 
improprieties at the borders but maintain a stance of dignified inaction year 
in year out.  
 In January 2007, the AHSG expressed concern over the “numerous 
obstacles still existing along West African highways and at the borders of 
ECOWAS Member States”36 They urged Member States to take all necessary 
measures to implement the Protocol on Free Movement and directed the 
ECOWAS Commission to “ensure the completion of the remaining portions 
of international highways and interconnection of railway networks with 
standard gauge”. The members of the AHSG being directly responsible for 
the implementation of the Protocols, are merely shirking from responsibility 
by merely expressing concern and directing Member States to do it. It is 
merely a diplomatic way of consigning the ECOWAS Protocols to the”Keep 
In View, (KIV) cabinet. 
 The ECOWAS 2008 Report acknowledged that harassment on 
ECOWAS highways and borders was still an issue to be tackled. It states 
thus:  
In the bid to eliminate road harassments, (the) 
ECOWAS Commission embarked upon reflection 
with technical partners for the establishment of an 
electronic registration system at border entry and exit 
points… A regional integrated border management 
programme is under negotiation with the European 
Union. This programme will help modernize border 
control posts and thus reduce time loss and 
racketeering.37 
 This perennial dependence on foreign help has become a subterfuge 
for inaction, political negligence and ineptitude in governance. All forms of 
sophisticated gadgetery can be placed at the borders but if they are manned 
by the same corrupt and extortionist officials, the situation will not change. It 
could even worsen because those personnel could render those gadgets out of 
use within days and return to business as usual because of having aclimatised 
to the regime of unaccountability and institutionally ingrained racketeering.   
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36Rescheduled Summit in Onagadougou, Burkina –Faso  
37 6 P. 77.  
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Surmounting the challenge and actualising the vision of integration 
 The experience of ECOWAS demonstrates that Treaty making goes 
beyond summits, fanfare and numerous Protocols. The goals of ECOWAS 
are salutary and if achieved could create an economic mini nirvana for the 
people whose economic well- being the Treaty/Protocols seek to uplift. To 
date, ECOWAS has not delivered on its agenda and the verdict, which is 
virtually unanimous amongst stakeholders is that the ECOWAS ship of State 
is still rigmaroling at the shore still looking forward to commencing its 
voyage. What constitutes ECOWAS today are the AHSG Summits, (a siren 
blowing fiesta), conferences, seminars and workshops, with piles of paper 
work. While all this is going on, the stakeholders and peoples await practical 
action. The authors avers that ECOWAS can work in accordance with a new 
agenda. 
 The AHSG has to adhere to the pacta sunt servanda rule, by which 
treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed in good faith. This 
principle is enshrined in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which States that “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties 
to it and must be performed by them in good faith”. With respect to the 
ECOWAS Treaty, the disposition of the parties as the evidence copiously 
shows, demonstrates that the parties are all in breach of Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention. 
 Demonstration of good faith in the view of the author, would be to 
comply with the provisions of the Protocol on Free Movement of Goods and 
Capital expeditiously. The long delay in keeping faith with the Protocol can 
be atoned for if the parties awake to the realities of the NWIEO in the area of 
economic integration. The attitude of the parties in clinging so tenaciously to 
their sovereignty, negates the pacta sunt servanda rule. The author contends 
that fear of loss of sovereignty is unfounded because in the long term, 
whatever sovereignty is sacrificed would elicit  benefits in the long term, in 
terms of expanded trade, access to a larger market and a boost in productivity 
as the private sector stretches to utilise the opportunities of the common 
market and favourable tariff regimes.  The tenacious clinging to sovereignty 
in order to avoid integration is only beneficial to the political leadership of 
the region. The people will benefit more from integration because of the 
increased economic opportunities, by way of new jobs, prosperity and a 
better “standard of living of its peoples… (and) economic stability.”38 The 
surrender of a little sovereignty for the purpose of strengthening the 
ECOWAS’ suprationality, is a worthwhile price to pay for all these benefits.  
 According to I.O.S. Nwachukwu, at its formation, ECOWAS held a 
lot of promise as one of the dynamic strategies through which economic 
                                                          
38 Article 2, 1975 Treaty. 
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underdevelopment could be surmounted and the all pervading poverty in the 
sub-region eliminated.39 This assumption was based on the unique size of the 
Community with its large population which was to serve not just as a means 
for the mobilisation of internal resources for industrialisation but also as a 
powerful attraction for the inflow of foreign investment.  
 From the experience of the EU, the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), the East African Community (EAC) and others, regional 
integration is undoubtedly arduous, but need not take 37 years to manifest. In 
Nwachukwu’s words, “the truth is that integration would only proceed well 
where the Member States  
are prepared to make sacrifices on different levels.”40 He added that “it is 
now evident that renewed energies are required and new paths cultivated, if a 
new lease of life was to be given to the Community for its optimal 
performance.”41 
 For these “new paths” to be charted, a new agenda has to be drawn 
up, with the ECOWAS Commission playing a key role. The Commission 
should move beyond just whining and writing reports to play a robust and 
activist role. The Commission was established to make ECOWAS function 
properly. In order to do this, it should partner with the media to highlight 
cases of breach of the Treaty/Protocols and place them in the front burner of 
public discourse within the region. The Commission should thus cease to be a 
mere bureaucratic institution but a spirited driver of the integration process. 
The issue of sanctions has to be visited. States should not breach the Protocol 
without some form of sanctions ranging from suspension to payment of 
heavy fines. In a situation where all the parties are guilty, this might be 
difficult, but the Commission, in collaboration with the media, Civil Society 
and other stakeholders can make this a prime item on the agenda of the 
AHSG. 
 Civil Society, NGOs and human rights activists have a big role to 
play. They should sponsor cases of human rights abuses by operators of the 
Protocols. Victims of harassment and extortion can also take class action 
which the media in the region should not take off their front pages and prime 
time for as long as the cases last. Thankfully, the ECOWAS Court of Justice 
has now granted access to private individuals, as opposed to the previous 
status-quo, when only State parties had access to the Court, as enshrined in 
Article 9(3) of the Protocol of the Court.42 
                                                          
39 G. O. Obiozor, (ed.), op. cit., p. xi. 
40  Ibid, p. xii. 
41 Ibid. 
42 74 Protol A/p1/7/91 
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 In Afolabi Olajide v. Federal Republic of Nigeria43, the Court ruled 
that the applicant, who had lost a huge amount of money because his goods 
were stranded at the Nigeria/Benin Republic border due to its closure by the 
Nigerian Government, could not bring an action before it, by virture of 
Article 9(3) of the Court’s Protocol. According to Anthony Anene – Maidoh, 
Olajide’s case “made it clear that the limited scope of the jurisdiction of the 
court, and denial of access… to individuals were grave and amount to the 
fundamental limitation of the rights of… West African individuals.”44 The 
President of the corut, Justice Hansine Donli after delivering the judgment 
urged formulators of the Act to broaden its scope to enable individuals to 
bring actions before the Court.45 
 In the case of Frank Ukor V. Rachad Lalaye,46 the Court on the 
same grounds, truck out the Plaintiff/Applicant’s meritorious action with 
respect to seizure of his truck and the goods therein, the order having been 
made by a Cotonou Court of first instance in January 2004. However, a 
Supplementary Protocol was enacted in 2005 which granted access to 
individuals, in compliance with the Court’s plea. Article 4 of the 
Supplementary Protocol amended the Protocol of the Court by inserting a 
new Article 10 which states in Article 1, (d), that “Access to the court is open 
to individuals on application for relief for violation of their human rights…” 
With respect to the  
 International law rule that exhaustion of local remedies is a 
requirement before recourse to international tribunals, the rule of the court is 
that it is not a requirement under the Community texts. 
 In the case of Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Republic of Niger,47 the 
applicant took advantage of the new rules by  
successfully bringing an action for violation of her human rights. She had 
been sold to a man who used her both as a slave and a concubine and when 
she escaped, she brought this action in which the Court ruled in her favour 
and awarded her ten million francs in damages. It is submitted that under the 
new rules, Olagide and Ukor would succeed. Individuals, Civil Society, 
NGOs and victims of abuse should take advantage of these new rules and 
apply judicial pressure on the organs of ECOWAS to become more 
pragmatic, and committed to the ideals of the Treaty/Protocols.  
                                                          
43 Case no- ECW/CCJ/04/2004 
44 Jurisdiction of the Community Court of Justice, ECOWAS, Paper by the Chief Registrar 
of the Court, During the Court’s sensitisation mission to Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria, 
from March 4 – 10, p. 4. 
45 Vanguard Newspaper, 28 April, 2004. 
46 Case no – APP/01/04, 17 March, 2005.  
47 Case no. ECW/CCJ/APP/11/07. 
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 In order for this to happen, public enlightenment must be done in a 
sustained and widespread manner. This should be carried to markets, schools 
and motor parks where cross border travellers throng, and airports. Fliers 
should be distributed to commuters, and cross border traders. Such fliers 
should provide capsule information on human rights and access to justice. If 
people are well informed, they will be empowered to seek redress when they 
encounter breaches. For example, a trader whose goods are unduly detained 
at the border for refusal to succumb to extortion could reek redress and if the 
culprits are punished and the media publicises these events, it will go a long 
way towards making commuting easier and integration possible.  
 After 40 years, a regional organisation should not have teething 
problems or be taking baby steps as is the case with ECOWAS. It is now 
cluttered with many bureaucracies,: (WAMI, WAMZ, EMCP, EBID, 
WAMA, et al) to oversee economic integration alone. So much money is 
being spent with minimal results. The 2008 report is not cheering:  
The year 2008 marks the second year of the 
transformation of the Executive Secretariat into a 
Commission… This process repositions the 
institutions of the ECOWAS on the march towards 
the realization of the ECOWAS vision…, which 
embodies the long – term aspiration of the 
Community- the transformation from an ECOWAS 
of States to an ECOWAS of people.48 
 It reveals that the Commission commenced laying the building 
blocks for the structures and institutions required to shoulder the challenges 
of realising the vision with a significant augmentation of the staff strength.49 
In other words, more money is to be spent and there are little or no 
indications as at the time of this writing that results are within sight. The 
2008 Report says ECOWAS is “on the march” towards the realization of the 
ECOWAS vision. In 2003, the Executive Secretary’s Report indicated that 
the leadership of the region “is gradually fusing the… countries in the region 
into a single state..”50  
 If this were so, in 2008, ECOWAS should not have been 
“marching”. It ought to have attained some level of success. Now, ECOWAS 
has fixed 2020 as the year of realisation of integration,51 just 8 years away. 
Unless it has a magic wand or an open seseme talisman in one of its cabinets, 
judging by what is on the ground today, even 2020 seems surreal.  
                                                          
48 81 P. 1811. 
49 Ibid. 
50 P. 1. 
51 2008 Report, p. 181. 
European Scientific Journal July 2016 edition vol.12, No.19 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
84 
 The ECOWAS realises that democracy, political stability and 
security are necessary for sustained economic development,52 which in turn 
creates a conducive atmosphere for integration. No one wants to integrate 
with a person whose house is on fire. The region is just coming out of 
conflict in Sierra-Leone and Liberia. Nigeria today is plagued by the severe 
security challenge posed by Boko Haram. The region is currently embroiled 
in the Guinea – Bissau coup crisis. Allied to this, the sit-tight syndrome of 
African leaders is threatening security in Benin, Niger and Senegal. 
Democracy has not found welcome climes in Africa. The result is that while 
such leaders are in office, the controversies that surround their ascendancy 
make them to harness all their energies, time and resources towards in 
retaining power. Thus, most of their attention is on domestic issues, leaving 
little or no time to attend to regional matters.  
 
Conclusion  
 The peculiar situation in the various ECOWAS countries should not 
be allowed to capsize the ECOWAS boat. The leaders of the region must be 
attuned to the fact that the political will to move beyond the nation State is a 
vital pre-requisite to attaining some minimal degree of regional cooperation. 
As far as the author is concerned, a more serious will is needed to achieve 
integration and the genuine regional unity that was envisioned by the 
founding fathers of the ECOWAS in order to fast track the integration 
process and take the peoples of the region to the “nirvana” the Founding 
Fathers Promised in the preamble to the 1975 and Revised Treaty.  
 In this era of increasing regionalism, integration is the recipe for the 
region to have a strong presence in Africa and the world. This will augur 
better for the region than to continue as a “balkanized West Africa.”53   
 As former military President of Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida has so 
aptly surmised: 
 ECOWAS is the answer to the (West African)  
Predicament of colonial balkanization. It is the 
remedy to the anomaly whereby our principal trading 
partners continue to be the metropolitan European 
powers, as opposed to our neighbors. Within the 
ECOWAS dream lies the firm promise of a self-
reliant and economically integrated West Africa, 
able to chart its destiny on the basis of economic 
equality with the developed countries.54 
                                                          
52 Ibid, p. 183. 
53 G. O. Obiozor, (ed.), op cit., p. 134. 
54 Nigeria’s then Military President, Ibrahim Babangida’s  speech at the 
ECOWAS Conference in Senegal. (Quoted in G. O. Obiozor, (ed.), op. cit., p. 134 
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Chimelu Chime, Integration and Politics Among African States: Limitations 
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